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Among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis are centrality measures, which quantify the importance of every node in the network. This centrality analysis typically disregards the possibility that the network may have been deliberately manipulated to mislead the analysis. To solve this problem, a recent study attempted to understand how a member of a social network could rewire the connections therein to avoid being identified as a leader of that network. However, the study was based on the assumption that the network analyzer—the seeker—is oblivious to any evasion attempts by the evader. In this paper, we relax this assumption by modeling the seeker and evader as strategic players in a Bayesian Stackelberg game. In this context, we study the complexity of various optimization problems, and analyze the equilibria of the game under different assumptions, thereby drawing the first conclusions in the literature regarding which centralities the seeker should use to maximize the chances of detecting a strategic evader. 

Link prediction is one of the fundamental problems in social network analysis. A common set of techniques for link prediction rely on similarity metrics which use the topology of the observed subnetwork to quantify the likelihood of unobserved links. Recently, similarity metrics for link prediction have been shown to be vulnerable to attacks whereby observations about the network are adversarially modified to hide target links. We propose a novel approach for increasing robustness of similarity-based link prediction by endowing the analyst with a restricted set of reliable queries which accurately measure the existence of queried links. The analyst aims to robustly predict a collection of possible links by optimally allocating the reliable queries. We formalize the analyst problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game in which they first choose the reliable queries, followed by an adversary who deletes a subset of links among the remaining (unreliable) queries by the analyst. The analyst in our model is uncertain about the particular target link the adversary attempts to hide, whereas the adversary has full information about the analyst and the network. Focusing on similarity metrics using only local information, we show that the problem is NP-Hard for both players, and devise two principled and efficient approaches for solving it approximately. Extensive experiments with real and synthetic networks demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. 

Link prediction is one of the fundamental problems in computational social science. A particularly common means to predict existence of unobserved links is via structural similarity metrics, such as the number of common neighbors; node pairs with higher similarity are thus deemed more likely to be linked. However, a number of applications of link prediction, such as predicting links in gang or terrorist networks, are adversarial, with another party incentivized to minimize its effectiveness by manipulating observed information about the network. We offer a comprehensive algorithmic investigation of the problem of attacking similarity-based link prediction through link deletion, focusing on two broad classes of such approaches, one which uses only local information about target links, and another which uses global network information. While we show several variations of the general problem to be NP-Hard for both local and global metrics, we exhibit a number of well-motivated special cases which are tractable. Additionally, we provide principled and empirically effective algorithms for the intractable cases, in some cases proving worst-case approximation guarantees.